Recency-Driven Herding in the Post-Goal Stage on the Reward-Based Crowdfunding Platform: A Threshold Model Perspective
Shuya Lu, Shih-Lun (Allen) Tseng, Yinglu (Elle) Wu, Fengxia Zhu, and Jianan Wu
International Journal of Electronic Commerce,
Volume 30, Number 4, 2026, pp. 474-506.
Abstract:
On reward-based crowdfunding platforms, existing research predominantly shows herd behavior is rational and depends on cumulative peer signals to drive campaign funding. This perspective implicitly assumes that herding becomes less relevant or diminishes once the goal is attained. Yet, herding may persist or even intensify in the postgoal stage, particularly when recent peer signals are observable and salient to backer decisions. Drawing on the threshold model, we introduce the concept of recency-driven herding, a behavior whereby backers rationally respond to recent peer signals when such signals become sufficiently salient. Using daily data from 5,446 Kickstarter campaigns, our analysis reveals that while herding becomes more pronounced in the post-goal stage, this strengthening depends on campaign type, funding magnitude, and time elapsed. We find that recency-driven herding becomes stronger for private-goods campaigns, specifically when campaigns are overfunded and approaching their deadlines, as recent peer signals may serve as social proof of product quality. In contrast, public-goods campaigns exhibit amplified recency-driven herding in the pre-goal stage when nearing their funding goals and deadlines, consistent with prosocial urgency to ensure project success. This study contributes to the literature by revealing how herding can be shaped by recent peer signals and identifying the contextual factors under which such recency-driven herding intensifies. We provide practical strategies for crowdfunding platforms and campaign creators on sustaining backer engagement by highlighting recent peer signals during specific windows.